A costly gamble Meduza analyzes Russia’s Kursk counteroffensive and what losing Sudzha means for Ukraine
The seven-month battle for control of a slice of Russia’s Kursk region is ending in a Ukrainian defeat. As has often happened over the past two years of the war, Ukrainian forces withdrew under the threat of encirclement — likely later than they should have. Some equipment was left behind, and many soldiers were killed or captured, but most of Ukraine’s troops managed to escape. From a political perspective, the incursion into the Kursk region seemingly brought Ukraine no gains. President Volodymyr Zelensky had repeatedly said the goal was to use occupied territory as leverage for a future exchange, but now Kyiv has nothing left to trade. Militarily, the outcome is harder to assess. For seven months, Ukraine’s presence in the region tied down a large Russian force, but Kyiv also committed some of its most battle-ready brigades to Sudzha — troops that might have been used more effectively had they withdrawn as soon as Russia launched its counteroffensive in the fall. Meduza analyzes how Russia’s counteroffensive in the Kursk region unfolded and what losing its foothold in Sudzha means for Ukraine.
What happened during Russia’s rapid advance in the Kursk region?
On March 8, Russian forces launched a new phase of their offensive to take back Ukraine’s foothold in the Kursk region. This phase had been carefully prepared: in the days leading up to it, Russian troops recaptured the villages of Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka on the western side of the foothold and crossed into Ukraine’s Sumy region.
This brought them close to the Ukrainian army’s main supply route — the Sudzha–Sumy road — while also physically cutting another supply line running north through Sverdlikovo. In the final week before the Russian assault, Ukrainian troops reported that deliveries to the bridgehead had nearly stopped due to relentless Russian drone strikes on the Sudzha–Sumy road. Another supply route south of Sudzha was also severed by Russian forces.
On the first day of the renewed offensive, Russian units struck north of Sudzha, effectively isolating the entire northern part of the bridgehead from the city. It was there, between the Sudzha–Kursk and Sudzha–Lgov roads, that Russian forward units emerged from a gas pipeline. Russian ground assaults were also concentrated in this area.
By the evening of March 8, Ukrainian forces had lost key defensive positions north of Sudzha, including Malaya Loknya and Martynovka. The next day, Russian forces retook another stronghold in Kazachya Loknya. Ukrainian troops suffered heavy losses during their hasty retreat from the northern part of the bridgehead.
At the same time, Russian forces launched an offensive on Sudzha’s eastern districts. Ukrainian troops were unable to mount a defense there, as Russian airstrikes had destroyed the bridges over the Sudzha River, which divides the city into western and eastern halves.
Eventually, Russian forces entered central Sudzha with little resistance — there was almost no direct fighting, as Ukrainian units withdrew toward the border.
Russian troops are now advancing toward the Sudzha border checkpoint and further south near the village of Guevo in the Kursk region. The remaining Ukrainian positions in the foothold are likely to fall in the coming days, shifting the fighting into Ukraine’s Sumy region. Russian forces already have a foothold there and are storming the village of Basivka, west of the Sudzha–Sumy road.
In any case, there are no thousands of encircled Ukrainian troops near Sudzha, despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s statement to that effect last Friday — apparently based on Putin’s claims.
Why did Ukraine launch the Kursk operation, and what did it achieve?
As early as 2022, an unusual situation had taken shape along the front line — it was distinctly divided into two sections of nearly equal length:
- An active front, stretching from the northeastern Kharkiv region to the mouth of the Dnipro River, where most forces were concentrated and both sides traded offensives and strikes
- A passive front, running from the junction of Ukraine’s borders with Belarus and Poland to Kharkiv, following the Belarusian-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian borders
Both sides conducted cross-border raids — Russia using GRU special forces, while Ukraine deployed larger units under the Main Intelligence Directorate. Ukrainian forces even managed to capture some border settlements, but only briefly before withdrawing back into Ukrainian territory.
Russia was the first to recognize the potential for large-scale strikes across the lightly defended “passive front” and deep into opposing territory. In early May 2024, it launched an operation north of Kharkiv, sending tens of thousands of troops from the Leningrad Military District, reinforced with newly formed units, across the border. They advanced several kilometers into Ukraine and seized part of Vovchansk. However, the offensive stalled around the fifth day when Ukrainian reserves arrived. At the time, Russian war bloggers wrote that the operation’s main goal was to divert Ukrainian reserves from Russia’s primary offensive in central Donbas.
By May, the Ukrainian command had likely begun planning its own cross-border offensive. The incursion began on August 6 and was initially successful — Ukrainian forces advanced 20–30 kilometers (12.5–18.5 miles) into Russia and took control of Sudzha, a district center. The Ukrainian command achieved operational surprise by framing its troop buildup near the border as a defensive measure against a potential Russian advance on Sumy in Ukraine. The main strike force was only moved into position at the last moment.
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At first, Kyiv justified the operation purely on military grounds. The initial explanation — that it was meant to protect the Sumy region and stop the shelling of the city, effectively creating a “buffer zone” — was quickly forgotten as the shelling only intensified.
The focus then shifted to the idea of diverting Russian forces from their summer offensive in southern and central Donbas. But by then, Russia had ample reserves across different sectors. Only one unit — the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade — was redeployed from the Donetsk front to the Kursk region. This brigade had previously been engaged in fighting near Vuhledar, but its redeployment had already begun before Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region; it remains unclear where the Russian command originally intended to deploy it.
Regardless, Russian forces captured Vuhledar without the 155th Brigade’s involvement. The bulk of Russia’s newly formed Kursk grouping came from quieter sectors — most forces were redeployed from near Kharkiv and Vovchansk, while others came from positions along the Dnipro in the Kherson region. Additionally, the 106th Guards Airborne Division was pulled from north of Bakhmut.
To sustain its offensive in Russia’s Kursk region, Ukraine assembled a force of about 15 brigades, including some of its most battle-ready units. Notably, Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley IFVs, was transferred to Sudzha from the front line south of Pokrovsk in central Donbas.
However, Ukrainian forces were unable to push deeper into the Kursk region. After failing to capture Korenevo or break through to the Rylsk–Lgov road behind Russian lines, they shifted to defensive positions.
At that point, Kyiv offered new reasons for continuing the operation — this time entirely political. The main rationale became President Volodymyr Zelensky’s publicly stated goal of exchanging Russian-held territory in Kursk region for parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia. In this regard, Ukraine has suffered an unequivocal setback. It now controls a foothold that — at best, and likely only temporarily — is half the size of the area Russia seized near Vovchansk alone.
Did Ukraine’s Kursk offensive buy it time? What if Russia had sent its reserves to Donbas?
Russia’s exact plans for these reserves last year remain unknown. It’s possible that Ukraine’s advance into the Kursk region did, in fact, disrupt an important Russian operation.
However, in the broader picture, committing significant Ukrainian forces to a previously quiet sector — and keeping them there even after Russia launched its counteroffensive in October 2024 — ultimately had negative consequences on the battlefield.
At the critical moment of Russia’s offensive in southern Donbas, Ukraine’s command had no available reserves. As a result, it lost the strongholds of Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka, along with a vast stretch of territory between Donetsk’s western outskirts and the Pokrovsk–Velyka Novosilka line with dozens of settlements.
Russian forces also made gains along secondary fronts, advancing to the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and the Dnipropetrovsk region’s border, crossing the Oskil River near Kupyansk, and capturing parts of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar north of Donetsk. At this stage, none of Ukraine’s territorial losses are offset by its gains in the Kursk region.
Thanks to successful breakthroughs in the summer and fall, Russia continues to hold the initiative in southern Donbas. It wasn’t until February 2025 that Ukraine managed to regroup and, through counterattacks, halt Russia’s advance along the Pokrovsk–Toretsk line. However, Russia is now redeploying forces from the southern front to Pokrovsk and Toretsk and may soon launch a renewed offensive.
Meanwhile, redeploying Ukrainian units withdrawn from Sudzha will be challenging. First, they suffered heavy losses, especially during the chaotic final stage of their retreat. Second, there is now a real threat that Russia will continue its offensive here into Ukraine’s Sumy region. Whether Moscow will act on this remains unclear — Putin has publicly urged his military command to “consider establishing a buffer zone in the Sumy region,” but this could also be a strategic bluff.
Russia also has reserves that were formally pulled from the front for the Kursk offensive but saw little action there. For example, Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division was transferred from Ukraine’s Kherson region to the border, yet its units didn’t take part in the assault on Sudzha.
As a result, Russia still holds the initiative, retains reserves, and has the flexibility to decide where to strike next. The Kursk operation has extended the active front line — an unfavorable development for Ukraine, which faces manpower shortages and a lack of fully combat-ready units. For Russia, however, an extended front is less of a burden, given its numerical advantage.
