‘Why would Russia concede anything when it’s already winning?’ Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center fellow Maksim Samorukov explains Donald Trump’s negotiating disadvantages and likely cynical plans in Ukraine
On February 18, representatives of Russia and the U.S. met in Saudi Arabia to begin discussions about ending the war in Ukraine. According to journalists, negotiators developed a three-stage plan, envisioning a ceasefire followed by presidential elections in Ukraine and, finally, the signing of a formal peace agreement. Meduza spoke to Maksim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, to learn more about the significance of the meeting in Riyadh and its chances of halting Russia’s bloody invasion.
Much has been written about the worldview Donald Trump apparently shares with Vladimir Putin. One key convergence evident in the U.S.-Russian negotiations on the war in Ukraine is that Trump and Putin agree that Ukraine should hold new presidential elections. “They’ve both talked about it extensively,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center fellow Maksim Samorukov told Meduza.
Samorukov believes the U.S. president has publicly invested too much in the Ukraine war to come away with nothing. This likely means he will reach some general agreement with Putin that stipulates a ceasefire, elections in Ukraine, and then a peace deal. However, Trump will entrust “lower levels” with the impossible work of determining how these stages are implemented practically. The U.S. president will tout his great achievement, citing its simplicity as its strength and genius — and wait for the initiative to fail slowly and quietly. Samorukov said he expects the process to break down at stage one, though Russia could conceivably “halt the fighting temporarily to keep Trump feeling good about Moscow.” When the settlement collapses, America’s president can say he’s blameless, insisting that he delivered on his promise to reach a deal.
U.S. leverage
Trump’s negotiations will fail because he has no meaningful leverage over Moscow. “Why would Russia concede anything when it’s already winning?” Samorukov told Meduza. “When it will get everything on its own anyway, without making any concessions, regardless of whether negotiations with Trump happen or not.” Samorukov pointed out that Ukraine’s dwindling army reserves and growing domestic political crisis (exacerbated by Washington’s talk of new elections needed) raise the Kremlin’s hopes that Kyiv might “collapse on its own.” “What matters most here is that the concessions the U.S. is proposing will end up in the Kremlin’s hands, regardless. And we can be certain it will grab them if it must,” said Samorukov.
Beyond territory and a path to regime change in Ukraine, what can the U.S. offer Moscow? Americans have agreed to restore embassy staff. “There’s nothing wrong with this, the more the merrier,” Samorukov told Meduza. Washington could even follow through on reestablishing economic cooperation. “The U.S. could make a lot of money here […], and for that, there’s absolutely no need to stop the fighting in Ukraine or for the U.S. to make any concessions on Ukraine.” (At the same time, Samorukov warned that any returning American businesses would be reluctant to make significant investments, given the precarious state of property rights for Western corporations in Russia.)
Whatever profits are at stake in resuming U.S.-Russian business ties, they don’t give Washington an advantage in negotiations. Trump is under the delusion that “the dream of selling as much as possible to the U.S.” is every country’s lodestar. This thinking is most evident in the White House’s apparent scheme to pry Russia away from China, but the idea is ludicrous, argued Samorukov: “The past several years have convinced Russia’s leadership that reliability exists only [in China], and the West cannot be trusted. The U.S. cannot offer Russia or China the same level of incentives that they are offering each other.”
Of course, the Kremlin’s demands don’t stop at Ukraine. “Essentially, it calls for a return to the pre–Cold War status regarding American military infrastructure in Europe. And it’s impossible to imagine that all of this would be granted just like that, without any concessions from Russia — even under a Trump administration,” Samorukov told Meduza.
Currently, it’s Trump’s ultimatum to Kyiv that dominates the news headlines. Samorukov believes Washington’s conditions for extensive mining rights in Ukraine were designed to make Kyiv appear uncooperative. Samorukov told Meduza that the Trump administration is likely waiting to declare: “Look, we offered them this, this, and that, but Ukraine is refusing, throwing a tantrum, and doesn’t want to sign anything. So, it’s Ukraine’s fault that the agreements are falling apart.”
But even Donald Trump’s White House is in no position to impose the concessions that Russia really wants in Ukraine: complete disarmament, the establishment of a regime loyal to the Kremlin, and Moscow’s control over the country.
Europe’s fate
“If there’s one constant in this ever-shifting war, it is the West’s unwillingness to send troops to Ukraine,” Samorukov told Meduza, arguing that Europeans believe simultaneously that the Russian threat to countries like Poland and the Baltic states is not urgent and that sending peacekeepers to Ukraine would deplete their vital self-defenses. European voters “want to keep their generous sick leave benefits and big pensions, to keep milking the system. They’d rather have trains running on time than invest in security.” When it comes to Russian aggression in the east, “that’s their problem,” Samorukov said of Western Europeans.
As accommodating as this sounds, Vladimir Putin still has no incentive to deal with the Europeans. “Why would he? What’s behind the Curzon Line?” Samorukov asked, referring to the demarcation line that guided negotiations at the 1945 Yalta Conference on Poland’s postwar eastern border. “If there aren’t American troops there, if nobody is there at all, then what Curzon Line are you talking about? It’s all ours.”
Sooner or later, Europe might be forced to deepen its ties with Russia again, Samorukov told Meduza: “It’s unlikely to happen as abruptly as it did in the U.S. under Trump — if only because Europe can’t do anything abruptly. It does everything slowly, in a highly coordinated manner, and with enormous inertia.” How the invasion of Ukraine ends will shape Europe’s reengagement with Moscow. For now, however, there’s no end in sight.
Interview by Vladislav Gorin
Summary by Kevin Rothrock